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FREE TRANSIT IN TERRITORIAL STRAITS:
JURISDICTION ON AN EVEN KEEL?
In 1974 the coastal and maritime nations of the world will
confront each other at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in Santiago, Chile in an attempt to define a treaty-based, uniform territorial sea width. One problem the conference will attempt to alleviate is the jurisdictional disputes regarding territorial seas and transit through them which have been rising proportionately with man's ability to use the oceans. The United States
has persistently challenged extensions of territorial sea limits beyond three miles, while many nations share the view that their national frontiers should extend to no less than twelve miles. Augmentation of territorial jurisdiction by an additional nine nautical
miles would overlap 116 international straits which contain high
seas under a three-mile rule.'
One hundred-twenty 2 sovereign
States overlook the seas adjacent to 200,000 miles of coastline, 3
and their national claims to maritime jurisdiction range from three
to 200 miles.4 An example is the Bering Strait, which is nineteen
nautical miles wide;5 if the United States were to claim a twelvemile limit, as does the Soviet Union, 6 another vital transit link
would be closed to free and unimpeded navigation.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea is the
most recent attempt to codify the sovereign right of coastal States
to regulate surface navigation in territorial straits. The Convention adopted a definition of "innocent passage" which provided
that transit through territorial waters is innocent so long as it is
"not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
1. Ratiner, United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis, 2 J. MAR. L. &
COMM. 263 (1971).
2. Stevenson, Who is to Control the Oceans: U.S. Policy and the 1973
Law of the Sea Conference, 6 INT'L LAW. 465, 472 (1972).
3. U.S. DEP'T STATE BUREAU INTELL. & RES., SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA,
GEOG. BULL. No. 3 at 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA].
4. U.S. DEP'T STATE BUREAU INTELL. & RES., NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS, GEOG. BULL. No. 36 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L
CLAIMS]. See also Addendum No. 1 dated March 31, 1972.
5. SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, supra note 3, at 23.
6. NAT'L CLAIMS, supra note 4, at 104.
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coastal state."7 The United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea" has accepted, for consideration, the United States draft
articles which fashion a new right of free transit through territorial straits.9 If this proposal is not adopted, many of these high
sea links seem destined to lose their former status as high seas
and become subject to the more restrictive rules of innocent passage as a result of either treaty establishment of a twelve-mile
territorial water limit or unilateral expansion of territorial jurisdiction beyond twelve miles. The United States regards the doctrine
of innocent passage as an inadequate tool for balancing coastal and
maritime shipping interests in these vital ocean links."0
This Comment will briefly review doctrines such as global
freedom of the high seas and innocent passage, concentrating on
the United States alternative to the elastic innocent passage concept and the need for a more thorough definition of the peace,
good order or security yardstick which now measures innocent
passage.
1.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND ITS EBB

Customary 1 and conventional 12 international law divide the
sea into two zones: the threadlike "territorial sea" zone over
which the coastal State exercises sovereign jurisdiction subject to
a right or privilege of innocent passage, and the spacious "high
7. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 2,
open for signature April 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S., 205 T.I.A.S. No. 5639; [reproduced in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1962)] [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea
Convention].
8. G.A. Res. 2750 (XXV) C, 17 Dec. 1970, U.N. Doc. A/8097 [reproduced in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 at 226 (1971)].
The 1973 conference probably will not accomplish as much as this 1970 resolution rule envisioned. Chile will host the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference at Santiago.
9. U.S. Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea, Straits and Fisheries, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 4 (1971), 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 261 at 263 (1971),
10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013 (1971) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Articles].
10. Id. Several maritime nations support the U.S. proposal. However, a
list of subjects and issues, sponsored by fifty-six coastal States of Africa, Asia,
Latin America, China, Iceland, Rumania, Spain and Yugoslavia, omitted "free
transit." See Stang, Political Cobwebs Beneath the Sea, 7 INT'L LAW. 1 at 5
(1973).
The United States referred to this omission as biased and unfair. U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/SR. 29, at 14 (1972).
11. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 487-504, 582-635 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 489-98, 499509 (1965).
12. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200; 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 842 (1958).
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seas" area in which passage is theoretically unrestricted. "[S]traits
which are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial
sea of a foreign State"1 consitute the access routes between oceans
and serve as trade, communication and defense links. These waters may now contain slices of high seas within them, but they
are increasingly coveted by coastal states eager to expand municipal jurisdiction.' 4
Escalation of territorial water claims is not a novel phenomenon: under authority of a 1493 Papal Bull Spain claimed the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico while Portugal claimed the Indian Ocean and most of the Atlantic.' 5 Dominant maritime interests of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, based upon
physical power to control, included the Adriatic by Venice, the
Baltic by Denmark and Sweden, and the seas of Ireland by England.1" But the concept of freedom of the seas supposedly prevailed over these closed sea concepts, and Grotius wrote that freedom of the high seas was considered to be one of the most fundamental rules of customary international law.' 7 It was eventually
codified in article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State shall validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by these articles and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
13. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.4. This definition
limits the scope of straits relevant to this Comment. Those straits not used for
such navigation are not considered herein; only those traditionally used for international transit as a defensive or economically required artery between oceans or
national territorial seas.
14. NATIONAL CLAIMS, supra note 4.
15. Francois, Rapport, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, 37, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/17 (1950). Translation provided by Anthony Menke, Editorial Board
Member, CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.
16. Address by John Stevenson, Legal Advisor Dep't of State before Phila-

delphia World Affairs Council and Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Feb. 18, 1970 [reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 434 (1970)]. For straits involved, see
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA,

17. H.

supra note 3, at 24, 25.

GRoTIuS, MARE LIBERUM

30-37 (Magoffin transl. 1916).
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These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all
States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States
in the exercise of freedom of the high seas. 18
Freedom of the seas is now fast becoming a misnomer for
current practices which frequently constitute the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction beyond the limits of recognized territorial seas.
For example, claims to exclusive control of mineral and living resources have been sanctioned by legal writers as a practical division of rights over the high seas between coastal and maritime
States.19 Assumption of greater maritime jurisdiction has been
far more customary in the last thirty years. Prior to the twentieth
century, noted commentaries regarding the lawful extent of maritime jurisdiction included "as far as cannon will carry; . . ."'I
and "I question whether there is a lawyer in the land who could
say."'" National claims to maritime jurisdiction were far less
conservative after World War H. Enlarged coastal State jurisdiction dismantled classical freedom of the seas concepts as typified by this statement: "It is the view of the Government. . . that
exercise of jurisdiction over . . . the continental shelf by the
contiguous nation is reasonable and just . .
,22 The most farreaching claim has been one of "sole sovereignty and jurisdiction . . . extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the
28
said coast.
A consequence of this trend is that strategic international
straits are rapidly falling within the dominion of coastal State territorial waters. Accordingly, the conflict intensifies between
18. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12, art. 2.

19. M.

McDOUGAL & W. BuRKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEANS:

A

CON-

630-63 (1962); D. JOHNSTON,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 445-67 (1965).
20. De dominio Mars, dissertation by Dutch judge Bynkershoek (1702),
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Magoffin transl. 1923).
Quoted with
permission of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in W. BISHOP
TEMPORARY

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

OF THE

INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS

SEA

590 (3d ed. 1971).

21. Debate by Australian legislator Barton, Australasian Federal Convention,
Melbourne Official Record of Debates, 3 March 1898 at 1858; 44 AUSTRALIAN
L.J. 192 at 200.
22. United States Presidential Proclamation 2667, September 28, 1945: Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg.
12303 (1945), 59 Stat. 884.
23. U.S. Naval War College, 51 INT'L LAw SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS
1956, at 265 (1957). Joint proclamation by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in 1952.
Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, The Republic of Korea, Panama, Sierra Leone, and
Uruguay also claim a 200-mile limit, NAT'L CLAIMS, supra note 4.
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maritime States exercising a continuously diminishing right to freedom of the sea and coastal States whose territorial sea claims restrict passage by various regulations.2 4 Ocean resource management, in view of increased technological extraction capabilities,2" coupled with the advent of highly mobile and vastly improved surface warships,2 6 have no doubt influenced the shifting
balance between freedom of the seas and intensified coastal State
control. In addition to the 116 straits which may no longer contain high seas due to treaty establishment of a twelve-mile limit,
unilateral territorial sea claims in excess of twelve miles may subject passage through other vital international arteries to the good
graces of the coastal States bordering the strait.2 7
II.

INNOCENT PASSAGE AND ITS SUBJECTIVE EARMARKS

A.

Dissent Amidst the Writers and 1958 Codifiers

For purposes of this analysis, the prime characteristic of the
territorial sea is that it entitles coastal States to exercise jurisdiction
over navigation through international straits within territorial waers, subject to a limited right of innocent passage.2 If territorial
jurisdiction is expanded by treaty from three to twelve miles, as
advocated by the preliminary session of the United Nations Law
of the Sea Conference, numerous trade, communication and defense links would be constricted.29 Unilateral claims of maritime
24. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.1, whereby "The
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent."
25. With a view toward abusive extractive practices and jurisdictional
zones broader than traditional ones, see generally Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, adopted April 28, 1958,
559 U.N.T.S. 285, T.I.A.S. No. 5969; 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 851; European Fisheries Convention of 1964 in D. BoWETr, THE LAW OF THE SEA 92 (1967); Declaration of Montivideo on the Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970 [reproduced in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1081].
26. See JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 449-78 (Surface Combatants)

(1971-72 ed.).
27. E.g., (least width in nautical miles): Florida Strait between Key West
and Cuba (82); Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico (105); Guadeloupe
Passage between France and England (28); Strait of Otranto between Albania
and Italy (41); Formosa Strait between Taiwan and Mainland China (74).
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, supra note 3, at 23-25.
28. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, articles 14-17.
29. See G.A. Res. 2750 (XXV) C, supra note 8. Due to failure of the
1958 and 1960 Conventions on the Law of the Sea to establish agreement regarding the breadth of the territorial sea, a preparatory meeting was held in February 1973 at London and another will be convened in November 1973 at New
York. The 1974 Law of the Sea Conference at Santiago will possibly center
around a twelve versus a three-mile territorial sea breadth.
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jurisdiction up to 200 miles have already eroded private, commercial, and military freedom of navigation. World wide acceptance of such a norm would result in a 30% reduction (50% according to Soviet geographers) of ocean area where unimpeded
shipping is now permitted. 30
The restrictive nature of innocent passage dictates that the
ships of maritime nations transiting straits enjoy only the right to
pass without the consent of the coastal State, with no right to overfly or transit submerged. Scientific research, fishing and exploitation of mineral resources of the coastal seabed are prohibited
without previous authorization. "P]assage is a word of motion,
and in its proper use it signifies continuous movement from one
place to another . . . not . . . for any other purpose than that of
transit. '31 The rationale of innocent passage "lies in the fact
that the whole world has a legitimate and necessary interest in be32
ing able to use the seas for the purposes of normal intercourse.
Grotius referred to the right of innocent passage as the
most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of
which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation
is free to travel to every other nation and to trade with it. 3
Hyde's interpretation went beyond that of Grotius' by including
warships as well as merchant ships within the purview of innocent passage, 4 but Hall later contended that "[t]his right of innocent passage does not extend to vessels of war. ''3 It is currently
unthinkable that Communist China would condone a squadron of
United States or Soviet Union missile ships proceeding through the
strait between Hainan Island and Mainland China under the guise
of innocent passage.
Since innocent passage derogates from coastal State sovereignty, the essential issue is to what extent it is a right on parity
with coastal State sovereignty, or a privilege which is subordinate to that sovereignty. 86 Lauterpacht advocated that innocent
30. Stevenson, supra note 2, at 466.
31. H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 46 (3d ed. 1959).
32. Id.
33. H. GROTIUS, supra note 17, at 7.
34. 1 C. HYvE,INTERNATIONAL LAW 516 (2d ed. 1945).
35. H. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 198 (8th ed. 1924). For a contemporary analysis advocating that there is no practical reason for discriminating
against warships, see M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 19, at 193.

36. Slonim, The Right of Innocent Passage and the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97 (1966). Analyzes
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passage be defined in terms of the former:
It is occasionally maintained that all nations have the right
of inoffensive passage . . . by usage only, and not by the
customary Law of Nations, and . . . in strict law a littoral
State may prevent such passage. This view cannot be accepted. An attempt. . . to prevent free navigation through
the maritime belt in time of peace would not be legally war87
ranted.
What a coastal nation considers innocent should be manifestly evident, but practices which regulated, suspended or denied innocent passage were nevertheless a central issue at the 1958 Geneva
codification conference. This divergence of analyses supplied
the background for the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, where
an attempt to harness the lowest common denominator of innocent passage resulted in the following codification:
Article 14.1. [S]hips of all States . . . shall enjoy the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Article 14.4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Article 16.1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps
in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.
Article 16.4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent
passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for
international navigation .... 38
Negotiations prior to adoption of article 14.4 rejected the International Law Commission proposal that "[p]assage is innocent
so long as the ship does not use the territorial sea for committing
any act prejudicial to the security of the coastal State. .. .
This version emphasized the acts of the ship in measuring innocence. The United States suggested the standard that "[plassage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the security of
the coastal State."4 ° This proposed article de-emphasized the
debates regarding the drafting of the key innocent passage articles of the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, arts. 14-17.
37. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 494.
38. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7.
39. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
40. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.l/L.28 Rev. 1 (1958).
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ship's acts as controlling the nature of its passage: the determination of innocence should not turn upon the type of ship, cargo or
its mere presence. However, the Danish, Norwegian and Soviet
delegates opposed the United States amendment, complaining that
the coastal State would be permitted too much discretion in determining whether the passage was innocent or not.4
Article 16.1 emphasizes prevention of passage which is prejudicial and does not necessarily turn upon whether the littoral
State's security has in fact been prejudiced. Article 14.4 permits
the coastal State to judge the innocence of the passage. It was
jointly proposed by the Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and
United States, and opposed by Indonesia, India and the Soviet Union.42 Indonesia urged that even the adopted draft, de-emphasizing ship's acts in favor of a coastal State determination of innocence, was too objective. The objection was to the wording
"innocent so long as it is not prejudicial. . . ."'I rather than
suspension of passage "if it should deem such suspension essential. . . ."'
In the absence of an independent organ that could
apply an objective rule, the only practical possibility was to leave
the subjective determination of innocence to the coastal States.
B.

Customary InternationalPractice4"

The 1930 Hague Conference on the Law of the Sea embraced
the view that the coastal State's exercise of authority over claimed
territorial waters amounts to actual sovereignty. 48 Contemporary practice conforms to this view. 47 The logical inference is
that innocent passage is a privilege, subject to reasonable regulation by the littoral State. However, strong treaty wording precludes
coastal States from prohibiting free passage in an article 16.4
strait,4 8 assuming that the passage is innocent. The Israeli dele41. 3 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 84 U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L.52 (1958). For a detailed analysis, see Slonim, supra note 36.

42. 3 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 94.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. (emphasis added).

45. Part B highlights a few of the more prominent innocent passage disputes in reference to article 16.4 straits. For a detailed compilation of documents and international policy statements regarding the law of the sea, see generally LAY, CHURCHILL, NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA

(1973).
46. H. SMITr, supra note 31, at 45.
47. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 487.
48. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.4.
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gate to the committee dealing with the regime of the high seas
criticized the unduly rigid distinction between the territorial sea
and the high seas, urging that the International Law Commission's
draft articles
Should be redrafted or regrouped so as to include both
innocent passage and passage on the high seas within the
framework of freedom of navigation . . . . [Wihen a ship
passing through the territorial sea enjoyed the right of innocent passage, independent of the sovereignty of the coastal
State . . . which formed an integral part of freedom of
navigation,. . . innocent passage was enjoyed as a right, and
49
not on sufferance.
Innocent passage of warships, if it can be said to exist at all,
is even more circumscribed than that of non-military vessels. A
recent incident illustrates the problem. In September of 1965, the
United States Coastguard icebreaker Northwind was the subject
of constant surveillance by Soviet aircraft and warships. Surveillance increased as it neared the Vil'kitskiy Strait,5" the key passage of the Northern Sea Route. Strong Soviet protest resulted
in the Northwind reversing course out of the strait. It was ordered to return to Seattle, Washington via the Atlantic Ocean, 51 resulting in a return voyage of several thousand additional miles.
During World War I, Jessup asserted that warships do not
enjoy the absolute legal right to transit territorial waters any more
than an alien army may cross land territory.52 During World
War II, BruSl contrasted the right of innocent passage for merchant ships with that of warships, the right of the latter not yet
being fully established. 5' An illustration of how tenuous the
privilege of warship passage is occurred on May 15, 1946, when
49. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/40, Twelfth Meeting, at 27 (1958) [emphasis
added]. On the Israeli viewpoint and Arab refusal to sign the Territorial Sea
Convention, see Johnson, Some Legal Problems of International Waterways, With
Particular Reference to the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, 31 MOD. L.
REv. 153 (1968).
50. Average width 40 miles. The Soviet Union asserted an "historic"
claim to this strait as completely territorial in nature and thus subjected it to
innocent passage regulations; while in the Kara Sea, Soviet territory lies in nearly
all directions.
51. R. PETRow, ACROSS THE ToP OF RussrA 340 (1967). Petrow was a
New York Times reporter aboard the Northwind to cover the first U.S. surface
transit of the Barents and Kara Seas.
52.

P. JEsstiP, THE LAW

120 (1927).
53. 1 E. BRUEL,

OF TERRITORIAL

WATERS

AND

MARrrIME JuRIS-

DICTION

INTERNATIONAL STRArrs

108 (1943).
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Albanian coastal batteries fired upon two British Cruisers passing
through the North Corfu Channel. The United Kingdom protested with its claim of innocent passage through the strait. Albania replied that foreign warships needed previous authorization
to transit the strait and subsequently laid mines. On October 22,
1946, two British warships struck mines in the Channel resulting
in a loss of 44 lives. The United Kingdom swept the Channel for
mines over Albania's protests. The International Court of Justice
held that in time of peace States have the right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation without
previous authorization of the coastal State, provided that passage
is innocent. 54 The Albanian Government asserted that because
of the mere presence of the warships the passage was not innocent,
but a political mission.55 The Court did not accept this contention and proceeded to consider the manner in which passage occurred in determining its innocence.
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention sets forth the basic substantive rule on passage through international straits: there shall
be no suspension of innocent passage of foreign ships. 56 The
opinion is widely held that the right of innocent passage through
claimed territorial seas, which serve as an artery for international
traffic, cannot be suspended or denied to any vessel, merchant
or military, in time of peace. 5 7 In practice, most nations permit
warship passage, but regard it as a privilege rather than a right.
The Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the 1958 Law of the
Sea Conference summarized innocent passage for warships as follows:
It is generally recognized under international law that merchant and other non-military vessels have the right of unhindered passage through the territorial waters of a foreign
coastal State, provided they use the customary shipping
routes. The coastal State has the right to lay down any rules
it wishes regarding the passage of warships, including a requirement that preliminary notification be given or permission obtained. 58
54. Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
558 (1949); J. SYATUW, DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 23
(2d ed. 1969).
55. Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 30.
56. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.4.
57. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 34, at 519.
58. Tunkin, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1958 International Affairs [Moscow], No. 7, at 48.
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The need for convening another Law of the Sea Conference
is evident from realization that past treaties and decisions have fostered disagreement due to lack of objective standards. Treaty
wording should allow all concerned to know what to expect. For
example, in order to safeguard Turkish security and avoid threats
to Black Sea riparian States, the 1936 Treaty of Montreux was
signed."
Merchant vessels of a non-warring country were permitted to transit the Straits of the Dardanelles and Seas of Marmora and Bosporus on the condition that they not assist the enemy.6 ° No criteria were expressed as to just what assisting the enemy meant. In lieu of establishing a concrete definition of innocent passage, entry by day only and transit by the route indicated
by Turkish authorities were required. 6 1 Future revocation of an
objective provision that might be subsequently unsuitable to the
contracting States was thereby avoided. The treaty provided
that vessels of war of Black Sea States were allowed transit through
straits after eight-day notification to Turkey, but that fifteen days
was required for non-Black Sea powers.6 2 The subjective elements
of the treaty were most evident in article 20, which provided that
"[i]f Turkey is belligerent in time of war, passage is entirely up to
' 63
the discretion of Turkey.
The Soviet Union has regarded its territorial waters as exclusive and has accepted no limitations with respect to foreign shipping, contending that alien vessels in Soviet waters possess only
those privileges which it grants. This practice has led to the
obstruction of innocent passage as a result of exclusive sovereignty
64
over large areas of water that other nations consider high seas.
Recent Soviet legislation provides that, due to the difficulty of navigation in the Vil'kitskiy Strait, 65 that icebreaker-pilotage escort
shall be compulsory for all vessels transiting the strait.6 6
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention espoused the principle
underlying the Corfu Channel decision in article 14.4 which states
59. Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, July 20, 1936, 173

L.N.T.S. 213; 31 AM. J. INT'L SUPP. 1 (1937).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1965).

Id. art. 5.
Id.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 20.
Comment, Soviet Concepts of Innocent Passage, 7 HARv. INT'L L.J. 113

65. See note 50 supra.
66. UNrrED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15,
at 187 (1970).
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that "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State."67 In conjunc68
tion with the article prohibiting suspension of innocent passage,
the burden would appear to be upon the coastal State to prove the
offensiveness of the passage. However, McDougal asserts that
"[S]hips . . . have a right of innocent passage, but within this
geographic zone [territorial sea] the burden is put upon such
ships of proving their innocence." 6 9 These subjective standards,
coupled with the unsatisfactory evolution of the doctrine of innocent passage, influenced the United States to propose a new
70
right of free transit in article 16.4 straits.
III.

FINDING

A

A.

NEW SOLUTION VERSUS DECIPHERING THE OLD

ProposedArticle 11.1: A New Solution

In the opening statement to the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea
Conference, the United States said in support of the three-mile limit
that "[t]he freedom of navigation on the high seas means the essential liberty of maritime transportation and communication unfettered by the requirement of consent by any foreign State."'" Representative Arthur Dean alluded to the longer, less economical circumnavigation and increased merchant shipping costs in avoiding
extended territorial waters. Extension of jurisdiction would similarly impose a burden on the coastal State to patrol larger areas.
He illustrated:
It is estimated that a general extention of the territorial sea
by 1 mile reduces the area of the high seas, where freedom
of fishing and other freedoms exist, by an estimated 280,000
square miles.

Likewise, it is estimated that a general exten-

tion of the territorial sea by an additional 9 miles would reduce the area of the high seas by 2,500,000 square miles, an
area roughly equal to the size of the United States of America
... . The effect of this in straits and other narrow seas
• . . [as] the Straits of Gibraltar [results in] no area of high
seas remaining. 72
67. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 14.4.
68. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.4.
69. McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Law of the Sea, in L
THE LAW OF THE SEA 3 at 17 (1967).

ALEXANDER,

70. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.4.
71. Address by Arthur Dean, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Law of the
Sea Conference, March 11, 1958, 38 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 574 (1958).
72. Id. at 579.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss2/22

12

Slomanson: Free Transit in Territorial Straits: Jursidiction on an Even Keel
1973

FREE TRANSIT IN TERRITORIAL STRAITS

On May 23, 1970, President Nixon announced the United
States intent to seek a treaty-based twelve-mile territorial sea limit,
conditioned upon the right of free transit in straits overlapped
by this expanded jurisdiction. 73 Of all the factors involved in
shaping this postulate, military security probably ranks first, as it
would in any other maritime nation. Innocent passage dictates
that submarines must transit surfaced, so a twelve-mile territorial sea, without some agreement providing for free transit, would
not be in the best interests of a missile launching submarine
navy tactically dependent upon maintaining unknown submerged
positions. 74 It is also unlikely that a maritime nation involved in
a limited war, as global powers sometimes are, would favor the
loss of the emotional impact of showing the flag three miles off
the coast of a belligerent nation. The ability to move men and
equipment from one area to another would be hampered by the
sealing-off of important straits and would necessitate circumnavigation. These military considerations constitute a part of the
traditionally strong naval plea for maximum freedom of the seas.75
Another reason for the willingness to shift to a twelve-mile limit
conditioned on free passage is suggested by the Pueblo incident
in 1968.76 The intelligence community would not be proportionately hindered in the open sea by a shift from a three to a
twelve-mile limit, but great difficulty would result if straits with
high seas in them were closed to hovering or slow-moving intelligence ships. Electronic eavesdropping capabilities are severely
reduced when a land barrier is interposed. Scientific ships would
not enjoy the freedom of bona fide scientific research or electronic
73. Letter dated May 25, 1970 to the Chairman of the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/22 (1970) [reproduced in 9 INT'L

806 (1970)] [hereinafter cited as Peaceful Uses Committee].
74. Improved sonar systems make it less likely that U.S. or U.S.S.R.

LEGAL MATERIALS

submarines can pass through narrow straits undetected. But there may be
some advantage to limiting knowledge of submerged passage to the few nations
with the technological and economic capacity to monitor such passage.
See
Knauss, Factors Influencing a U.S. Position in a Future Law of the Sea Confer-

ence, LAw
(1971).

OF THE SEA INSTITUTE,

UNiv. R.I.

OCCASIONAL PAPER

No. 10, at 3

75. Id. at 5.
76. U.S. scientific research ship, fitted with electronic eavesdropping de-

vices, allegedly in territorial waters when captured off North Korea in 1968. U.S.
Secretary of State deemed seizure an act of war. TIME, Feb. 2, 1968, at 13. N.
Korea replied Pueblo in territorial waters carrying out hostile acts against its

sovereignty. New York Times, Jan. 24, 1968, at 1.
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eavesdropping in straits which would forfeit their status as high
seas due to overlap by territorial waters.
A substantial influence on the shift from a three-mile limit
to a twelve-mile limit conditioned on free transit, has been the increasing acceptance of the latter as a customary norm. At the
1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, only eleven asserted a limit
of twelve miles. 77 At present, fifty-eight States claim territorial
seas of twelve miles. 78 Since nearly one-half of all coastal States
presently agree upon a twelve-mile limit, the United States reversed
its 1958 support of a three-mile limit, subject to a recognition
79
of free transit through vital straits.
Coastal State practices have fostered varied interpretations
of the innocent passage articles of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, to the detriment of maritime nations. It is probable that
the coastal Sovereign rarely considers suspension or denial of "offensive" passage to be a delict in international law since contracting parties generally perform in accordance with their "interpretation" of what they deem proper. Coastal nations desire to restrict passage when they experience or anticipate any prejudicial
affect upon internal well-being. So, in view of the generally acceptable conventional wording, a broad spectrum of activity has
been 0construed to negatively affect "peace, good order or secur8
ity."
The United States is apparently seeking to avoid similar interpretational conflicts as a result of the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference. It has formulated a new concept of international law which
would preserve free passage in article 16.4 straits8 ' if a twelve-mile
territorial sea is adopted. On July 30, 1971, the United States
submitted draft articles 2 to the United Nations Sub-Committee II
77. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 594 (3d ed.
1971). Three States claimed four-mile limits, one State claimed five, twelve
States claimed six. Those claiming twelve nautical miles were Bulgaria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Libya, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet
Union, the United Arab Republic and Venezuela. Ten States claimed in excess of twelve miles.
78. Stevenson, supra note 2, at 472.
79. For additional points supporting the U.S. position on a twelve-mile limit,
but beyond the scope of this Comment, see Stevenson, supra note 2, at 469-71.
80. Territorial Sea Convention, supr'a note 7.
81. Id.
The Soviet Union subsequently
82. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9.
proposed the same right. U.S.S.R. Draft Articles on Straits used for International Navigation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.7 (1972). The United King-
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on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction. Acceptance of one of these
articles would create a new right, presently unrecognized in international law: that of free transit through territorial straits."3
This would supersede customary innocent passage to the extent
that the coastal State would no longer have the general power to
exclude what it considers offensive transit through its territorial
waters.
Multilateral adoption of this new right would sever the bulk
of loose ends from conference-table balancing of coastal and maritime interests. For example, the extent to which the Territorial
Sea Convention could be invoked to prohibit military transport
through territorial seas would be drastically limited. Warships
have commonly been excluded as offensive per se,8 4 and it is possible that military transports carrying troops can presently be denied passage, as well as commercial ships carrying military supplies.8 5 If a right of free transit were guaranteed to maritime nations, as envisioned by the draft article, the issue of warships and
innocent passage would be resolved. This would necessarily result since innocent passage would in effect be a right to be exercised on a parity with (if not superior to) the current right of
coastal States to regulate passage through straits. The subjective
earmarks of innocent passage would fade since:
In straits used for international navigation between one part
of two high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State, all ships . . . in transit shall
enjoy the same freedom of navigation . . . for the purpose
of transit through . . . such straits, as they have on the high
seas ....
86
dom supports the U.S. draft articles. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.H/SR.27,
at 6 (1972). France has indicated its policy of applying high seas principles,
rather than innocent passage, to territorial straits. Queneudec, French National
Policy, February, 1973 (unpublished working paper submitted to the preparatory
conference held at London, February, 1973).
83. Id., art. 11.1.
Spain [U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.42, at 2-3
(1972)] and Tanzania [U.N. Doc. A/AC.l38/SC.II/SR.40, at 4-6 (1972)]
expressed hostility to any proposal allowing greater than innocent passage
through straits.
84. See P. JEssup, supra note 52 and Tunkin, supra note 58.
85. Treaty of Montreux, supra note 59, art. 20, whereby if Turkey is a
belligerent, passage through the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus is entirely
up to the discretion of Turkey.
86. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9.
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Free Transit in TerritorialStraits: An Evaluation

A realistic analysis of the new solution necessarily begins
with the premise that maritime powers have a vital interest in preserving freedom of movement in order to safeguard security and facilitate international trade.8 Whether or not subject to a right of
free transit, the twelve-mile rule cannot enhance international political stability, and will intensify competition for strategic advantages in straits where passage is now freely conducted. 88 As
national claims of coastal states to maritime jurisdiction expand
from three or twelve nautical miles, free navigation will be circumscribed by coastal sovereignty over an additional 2,500,000
miles including at least 116 transportation, communication and
defense arteries. The contemporary doctrine of innocent passage
is clearly not an adequate yardstick for measuring the balance
between coastal and maritime interests in these straits.8 9 Coastal
States exercise sovereignty over territorial seas, and an increasing number of them support a twelve-mile limit. 90 The inference is readily drawn that these same nations would not be
willing to shed a portion of this coveted sovereignty to the free
transit ideal espoused by the United States or other traditional supporters of freedom of the seas.
The strength of potential control which a coastal State might
exercise over shipping within territorial waters is demonstrated by
Portugal, Communist China, and the Soviet Union. Portugal's
Law on Territorial Waters provides that passage is offensive even
when it only indirectly affects peace, order or security; specifically, when a vessel "Ib]y its conduct, its objectives, the nature of
its cargo, the persons on board, or for any other reason, fails to
observe the provisions of Portugese law governing jurisdiction
within the territorial sea."'" Communist Chinese control of the
Chiungchow Strait 92 is unmercifully strict for foreign non-mili87. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9 at 261 [1013].
88. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9 at 263 [10141.

89. See e.g., Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; J. SYA23 (2d ed. 1969).
90. From eleven in 1958 to fifty-eight in 1972. W. BISHOP, supra note 77,
and Stevenson, supra note 2, at 472.
91. Law on Territorial Waters, DIARuo Do GOVERNO, Series I, No. 194
(1966) [emphasis added] [reproduced in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1094 (1966)].
92. Chiungchow Strait (least width 10 nautical miles) is the passage between Luichow Peninsula on the mainland of China and Hainan Island, leading
from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1969, I was aboard a vessel which was not permitted to transit the strait. It circumnavigated Hainan
TAUW, DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
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tary vessels, which may proceed only by day:
Forty-eight hours prior to the vessel's entry into the [strait]
. . .it must cable the Chiungchow Strait Administration informing the latter in detail about its name, nationality, tonnage, speed, color, and smokestack marks as well as the date
and the name of place of embarcation and disembarcation,
and requesting permission to pass through the strait.95
The Soviet Union's dominion of the Northern Sea Route indicates
that it would not acquiesce in any substantial derogation of its exclusive territorial strait sovereignty, forty miles wide in one strait. 94
Russian administration of the route involves coordinating the
movement of all vessels using the seas and straits of the route.
Pilotage is compulsory for all vessels under the pretext of naviga95
tional safety and pollution control.
The United States proposal for free transit in territorial
straits is based upon the belief that straits wider than six miles
have high seas within them and that the present rule of international law pertaining to all straits of consequence calls for freedom
of the high seas.9 6 The inability of the 1930 Hague Codification
Conference and the failure of the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences to arrive at an acceptable territorial sea breadth, however, are persuasive evidence that no such customary rule exists.
The 1956 Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists at
Mexico City outvoted the United States by fifteen to one to pass a
resolution which states that "[t]he distance of three miles as the
limit of territorial waters is insufficient, and does not constitute
a general rule of international law."' 97 Even assuming that a threemile customary rule does exist, the vital interests of coastal States
Island and proceeded into the Gulf of Tonkin. When we accidently passed
within 11.8 nautical miles of the Island, thereby infringing upon China's twelvemile limit, fire control radar illuminated our vessel and a message of protest was
dispatched to the U.S. Government.
93. Order of the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic, 145th
Plenary Session, June 5, 1964, Peking radio broadcast, June 28, 1964 [reproduced
in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 926 (1964)].
94. Supra note 50, regarding the Vil'kitskiy Strait. Continued promotion
of its proposal for free transit in such straits will probably fade as coastal
State opposition emerges at the 1973, and subsequent, conferences.
95. Sobranie Postanovlenii Soveta Ministrov S.S.R., No. 17, Item 124
(1971) [reproduced in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 645 (1972)].
96. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9, at 263 [1016].
97. Principles of Mexico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea, 1956 Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, U.S. Naval War College, 51 INT'L
LAw SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS 1955, at 244 (1957).
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often clash with such a rule. Further, prejudice to peace, good
order or security provides a handy legal tool for impairing free
transit in what non-coastal States might consider high seas, a tool
which coastal states will not be eager to give up.
The United States predicts that while coastal States located on
strategic straits can expect some benefit from greater control
over international navigation whether or not the free transit proposal is adopted, they will be subjected to strong and conflicting
domestic and international pressures regarding the exercise of that
control. 98 For example, the economic feasibility of permitting
the passage of nuclear-powered ships and supertankers might be
outweighed by pressure from internal or external self-serving political groups. While this proposition is logically provable, it
would not deter the coastal State's desire for jurisdiction and control commensurate with its newly acquired jurisdiction. It is inevitably difficult to reconcile coastal State expansion of maritime
jurisdiction with a right of other nations to transit strategic
straits as if there were no territorial seas within them. Supervision of marine pollution and traffic separation agreements by an
international authority9 9 has been suggested as a method of ensuring preservation of coastal State interests if the free transit proposal is adopted.'
If exercise of the right of free transit results in "serious" violation of coastal State laws, it has been
proposed that the coastal State may arrest the ship or, in the case
of a warship, require it to depart the territorial seas.' 0 ' Since these
rights are now claimed by strait States,10 ' they would certainly
claim that all cases are serious and therefore retain the power to
98. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9, at 263 [1015].
99. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO) is a
specialized U.N. agency well suited to establish minimum international standards. IMCO has proposed more than 50 schemes to date. IMCO, SHIPS
ROUTING AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES (2d ed. 1971).

100. Address by John Stevenson, U.S. Representative to Peaceful Uses Committee, July 28, 1972, (text obtained from U.S. Dep't State, Office of Legal Advisor).
101. Id.
102. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9; 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20 (1935).
A violation of Turkey's interests on
adjacent high seas was sufficient to delay departure of the Lotus after it entered

port and a French officer was arrested for his part in a collision between French
and Turkish vessels.

By analogy, coastal rights in territorial waters include the

rights of arrest (Territorial Sea Convention, article 19), banning offensive warship passage (Corfu Channel Case), and are staunchly ingrained in international
law.
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control transit in their territorial waters. Rather than permitting
the free transit proposal to limit their vital interests, it is probable
that strait States will opt for innocent passage in order to regulate free transit as they deem necessary.
In its simplest terms, freedom of the seas dictates that "no
state shall validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty."' °
However, "the coastal State may . . . suspend
•. innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security."'0 4 With a view toward
an acceptable, and therefore practical, balance of conflicting interests in the high sea and territorial sea, the 1974 Law of the Sea
Conference will labor within a volatile framework. Any acceptable twelve-mile territorial sea agreement will include the privilege of innocent passage through international straits as through
any other territorial sea. An attempt to enlarge this privilege will
dilute jurisdiction and arouse too much coastal State opposition,
lowering the sails when at least limited progress could be made.
In response to the United States twelve-mile limit proposal, including the right of free territorial strait transit, the People's Republic of China attacked the draft articles as a wanton distortion
of the freedom of navigation.' 0 5 The Chinese Representative
charged that the super powers would have the freedom to dominate the coastal countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which
would not have the right to defend their own territorial seas.
Therefore, the Chinese argue that such freedom should not be condoned at the 1974 Conference.'0 6
The issue of territorial sea breadth must be settled before the
free transit proposal will be considered, and it remains unresolved
after all codification attempts. Prospects for progress would be
brighter if the innocent passage articles adopted at the 1958 Geneva Conference were overhauled; they can and should be specifically altered to resolve issues such as what constitutes offensive passage, whether innocent passage is a privilege or a right,
and requirements for warship passage. Since divergent viewpoints on these and other innocent passage issues confront the
103. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 12, article 2.
104. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7, art. 16.3.

105. Address by People's Republic of China Representative to Peaceful Uses
Committee, March 3, 1972, [reproduced in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 654, at 657
(1972)].
106. Id. at 658.
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Territorial Sea Convention, 10 7 a more complete codification might
alleviate the need for free transit, thereby preserving the strait
State's just and reasonable right to control the territory near its
coast. While this might seem a simplistic solution at first glance,
it is more practical than asserting a new maritime right of free
transit in territorial waters which threatens to emasculate coastal
State sovereignty. A tenable definition of "peace, good order or
security" would be a more realistic means to the end of striking
a successful international balance between freedom of the seas
and coastal State sovereignty.
C.

A Viable Definition of Peace, Good Order or Security

Multilateral treaty language typically utilizes the lowest
common denominator in arriving at a solution which is broad
enough to be acceptable. Threats to the "peace, good order or
security" of the costal State is an example: it cannot be
totally avoided since the interests of strait States differ greatly
from maritime States. However, this language cannot be relied
upon as the key for reconciling those interests. Considering the
vagueness of "peace, good order or security," legal writers' varied
interpretations of the phrase must be used as a subsidiary reference;
this guarantees the ineffectuality of the provision. The following
draft articles may be sufficiently unfettered by traditional norms to
propose a more workable accommodation of freedom of transit and
valid security concerns:
Article A. Non-military ships of all States shall enjoy the
privilege of innocent passage on parity with the right of the
coastal State to deny passage that is prejudicial to its peace,
good order or security.' 08
Article B. 1. Non-military vessels shall observe coastal
State regulation of military cargo when the coastal State is
belligerent. If not belligerent, meaning not involved in a declared war as declared to the United Nations, the coastal State
cannot suspend the privilege of passage.
Article B. 2. Warships, including auxiliaries or any craft
utilized for combat purposes, may be considered offensive
107. See generally Slonim, supra note 36.
108. This would resolve the distinction between privilege and right, in reference to the quality of interest possessed by maritime and coastal States. It
would also set the stage for a subsequent article that would define "non-military" and indicate that the warship is not able to enjoy the same privilege as
non-military ships.
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by the coastal State and therefore excluded from passage
through straits less than 24 miles wide. However, if the
coastal State or States are not belligerent, a request for previous authorization to pass must be granted if approved by
the State(s) or by unanimous vote of a permanent United
Nation's body composed of representatives from ratifying
Parties.

1 09

IV.

CONCLUSION

Arbitrary and unreasonable coastal State regulations merely
inconvenience maritime nations when applied to territorial waters
off an open coast, but they severely hamper vital navigation when
To avoid
applied to straits overlapped by territorial waters."'
maritime crisis, the United States hopes to condition the shift to a
twelve-mile territorial sea upon free transit in indispensible straits
which would be overlapped by expanded territorial seas."' The
proposal is impractical although freedom of the seas, which survived harsh attack 350 years ago, would continue to survive. In
the past thirty years, the needs of riparian States to conserve resources, to monitor the presence of alien warships, and to prevent
pollution have proportionately intensified with the volume of strait
traffic.
There is even less agreement on the conventional norms now,
than there was in 1958. As ocean use intensifies, the likelihood
of agreement diminishes. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 1974
Conference will establish a conventional twelve-mile limit, so that
the free transit proposal can be subjected to the adversary process. If it is debated, any attempt to enlarge the privilege of innocent passage to a right of free transit will hopelessly foreclose
the possibility of striking a balance between maritime and coastal
interests beyond the previous, and inadequate, "peace, good or109. Any reservation to this article would be inconsistent with its purpose
of providing a scheme for controlling warship passage, once a nation is willing
to ratify the treaty. Opposing strait States would not ratify, but such a codification would at least establish evidence of a workable norm regarding warship
passage. If strait States did not ratify, they would be subject to whatever
transit practice maritime nations would chose. They would have no advance
notice of the warship's arrival.
110. Address by John Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the Peaceful Uses
Committee, August 14, 1972, (text obtained from U.S. Dep't State, Office of Legal Advisor).
111. U.S. Draft Articles, supra note 9.
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der or security" yardstick of the 1958 Territorial Seas Treaty.' 12
There is a need for a workable arrangement between maritime nations eager to retain the traditional protection of navigation that freedom of the sea affords, and coastal nations eager to
prevent strait transit that is detrimental to their coastlines. When
such vital interests clash, subjective treaty interpretation is a convenient device for preserving these interests. Rules with greater
objectivity will no doubt be even more obnoxious to many than the
1958 test. Hopefully, the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference delegates will recall that non-objective wording may provide interim
satisfaction while the conference is convened, but ultimate dissatisfaction when lack of concrete standards points to the need for
another conference.
William R. Slomanson

112. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 7.
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